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latter's vendor, who was a local distributor, and (3) the manu-
facturer of a steam bath unit. His actions against the seller and
the distributor were dismissed by the trial court and he was
given judgment against the manufacturer. He appealed inasmuch
as the judgment dismissed his action against the seller and the
distributor. It was held on appeal that plaintiff's suit against the
seller should not have been dismissed. The dismissal in favor of
the distributor was upheld on the ground of lack of privity. Not
considered was the propriety of the judgment against the manu-
facturer since this defendant had made no appearance at any
time in the suit. Inasmuch as the seller had bought the unit from
the distributor it would appear that the plaintiff acquired by way
of tacit assignment the seller's right against the distributor,7 but
this contention was apparently not presented to the court. From
this point of view, privity is not the issue although a question
does arise concerning whether the buyer may sue both his vendor
and his vendor's vendor.8
TORTS
William E. Crawford*
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Grant v. Touro Infirmary'
correctly held a surgeon negligent for his failure to remove a
sponge from an incision before closing it. The general rule ac-
cording to Corpus Juris Secundum,2 classifying the failure as
negligence per se, was cited with approval.
The court also held that the surgeon and the hospital had
a division of control over the nurses attending the operation and
assisting with it; hence, the borrowed servant rule did not apply.
The conduct of the nurses was material because a nurse's failure
to count sponges correctly during the operation was clearly negli-
gent.
The precise nature of the nurse's function was also important
on the overpowering issue of whether Touro's liability insurance
carrier had correctly denied coverage and refused to defend in
reliance on the clauses in the policy excluding coverage for the
7. See McEachern v. Plauche Lumber & Const. Co., 220 La. 696, 57 So.2d
405 (1952); POTHIER, CONTRAT DE VENTE nos 215-16 (Bugnet ed. 1861).
8. Id.
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
I. 254 La. 204, 223 So.2d 148 (1969).
2. 70 C.J.S. Phys4cians and Surgeons § 48, at 969 (1951).
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rendering of medical, surgical, or nursing services or treatment.8
The insurer argued that the counting of the sponges was the
rendering of nursing services and also was service of a profes-
sional nature. The court held, in accordance with prior juris-
prudence, that counting sponges was not a professional service,
nor was it within any of the other exclusionary clauses of the
policy.
With the insurer's diligent denial of coverage as an issue in
the case, it was predictable that the charitable immunity claimed
by Touro would be attacked, not only on the premise that the
hospital did not qualify for the doctrine, but that the doctrine
itself should be repudiated by the Louisiana courts. On the first
count, Touro was found to qualify exactly for the definition of a
public charitable institution both under the Louisiana juris-
prudence and that recited in American Jurisprudence. 4 On the
second count, the court said such a change in the law should be
left to the legislature. The majority opinion was not particularly
sanguine about the retention or rejection of the doctrine, on
the one hand, citing the criticism of the doctrine by text-writers
and by the decisions in some states and, on the other, citing the
long acceptance of the doctrine in our courts, and its present
restricted character.
Three Justices vigorously dissented from the retention of
the doctrine, arguing basically that it is no longer a sound theory
and, having been court-adopted, could be court-repudiated.
If the court were convinced the doctrine should be rejected,
there is ample authority-from no less than the fabled G6ny-
that it would be proper judicial method for the court itself to
interpret anew not only the customary law, but the written law
as well, to implement the current values of society, and thus
abandon the theory without legislative sanction.5
3. Grant v. Touro Infirmary, 254 La. 204, 211, 223 So.2d 148, 151 (1969):
"A. The Rendering Of Or Failure To Render
"1) Medical, surgical . . .or nursing service or treatment; ...
"2) Any service or treatment conducive to health or of a profes-
sional nature; ...
"B. The Furnishing Or Disposal Of . . . Surgical Supplies Or Ap-
pliances ....
4. Jordan v. Touro Infirmary, 123 So. 726 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1922). 15
AM. JUR. 2D, Charities § 148 at 156 (1964).
5. G9NY, METHOD OF INTERPRETATION AND SOURCES OF PRIVATE POSITIVE LAW
no. 186 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1963).
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Continuing in the medical field, the fourth circuits con-
sidered the same type of exclusionary clause as described above
in Grant v. Touro and concluded that the decision of the nurses
in a hospital to refrain from calling the doctor for a patient in
worsening condition was an act of nursing service falling squarely
within the exclusion.
In Cothern v. LaRocca7 a restaurant operator was held liable
in damages to a patron-plaintiff who was injured as she alighted
from her car and stepped into a hole in the ground which housed
a water valve. A wooden shield usually covered the hole, but
was missing at the time of the injury. The hole was not on the
restaurant property but was on the property of the adjoining
motel. Plaintiff's car was parked partially on the restaurant
property and partially on the motel property, as other restaurant
patrons often parked. The court exonerated the motel owner
on the grounds that plaintiff was at best a licensee and the motel
owner had not breached the duty of care thus owed to her.
The restaurant owner's liability was predicated upon the rule
that a "lessee who invites the public to his leased premises owes
to them the reasonable care of providing a safe place for them
therein." The obvious problem is raised that a burden of care
for another's premises may have been imposed upon this lessee.
The exoneration of the motel owner and the casting in judgment
of the restaurant operator both seem eminently just, and the
jurisprudential solution seems to be as good as any which might
be worked out. The case illustrates, however, the wisdom of
abandoning the thicket of invitee-licensee-trespasser distinctions
and of applying instead the conventional rules of ordinary negli-
gence, which is what the court here seems to have done very
well. A student casenote will discuss the case in a later issue
of this Review.
In Bazanac v. State of Louisiana, Department of Highways,9
the court held that the highway department was immune from
suit in tort and that the immunity was not affected by the
Hamilton0 case or by the 1960 amendment to article 3, section
35, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921. On the other hand,
6. Tankersley v. Ins. Co. of North America, 216 So.2d 333 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1968).
7. 221 So.2d 836 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
8. Id. at 842.
9. 218 So.2d 121 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
10. Hamilton v. City of Shreveport, 247 La. 784, 174 So.2d 529 (1965).
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the First Circuit and the Third Circuit Courts of Appeal both
have held to the contrary in the Lambert" and Herrin12 cases,
respectively. Additionally, in Bazanac, the fourth circuit held
that the provisions of Civil Code article 667 do not apply to the
highway department, while in the Reymond case the first cir-
cuit held to the contrary. In view of the writs granted by the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Bazanac and in Herrin, the conflict
should soon be resolved.
. Boudreaux v. Allstate Finance Corporation18 adds to the
growing list of cases properly allowing damages for emotional
distress produced by intentional harassment and embarrassment
of a debtor by his creditor.
In Marcantel v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. 14 the court said:
"... When opposing versions of an accident are given
at a trial, and when under either version at least some of
the parties to the trial must necessarily recover, the deci-
sional function requires the trier to adjudicate the determi-
native fact issue which will resolve which party recovers.
Under such circumstances, the trier of fact commits error
of law when it rejects all claims by refusing to decide which
version is correct or to determine the central fact-issue
simultaneously essential to the recovery by one party and
to the denial of recovery to the other." (Emphasis added.)
The quoted passage is the essence of the concurring opinion
amplifying the holding in Marcantel. It announces a judicial
obligation for fact finding which the Louisiana Supreme Court
has enunciated and which has been enforced a number of times.
Marcantel involved a head-on collision with claims by guest pas-
sengers and others in both cars. The evidence was conflicting
as to which car, if either, was in the wrong lane when the impact
occurred. The trial court said it could not resolve the conflicting
testimony on that point of fact and dismissed all suits for lack
of a preponderance of evidence of negligence on the part of either
driver. One guest passenger-claimant should have recovered
regardless of the lane in which the impact occurred. The appel-
late court here admonished the trial court that at the conclusion
of the taking of evidence every essential fact has either been
11. Lambert v. Austin Bridge Co., 189 So.2d 752 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
12. Herrin v. Perry, 215 So.2d 177 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
13. 217 So.2d 439 (La. App. lst Cir. 1968).
14. 219 So.2d 180, 185 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969).
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established by a preponderance of the evidence' 5 or it has not,
and found that the pile of debris in one lane gave a preponder-
ance. In utilizing this burden to find the facts based upon the
evidence adduced, one must keep in mind the distinction between
discharging the burden of proof on a disputed fact and discharg-
ing the burden of establishing all essential facts requisite to
proving the cause of action urged.
MATRIMONIAL REGIMES
Robert A. Pascal*
SCOPE OF THE SECTION
The Symposium of last year' did not contain a discussion of
the matrimonial regime decisions of the judicial year 1967-68.
For this reason the more significant decisions of that year and
the present judicial year will be mentioned here. Space limita-
tions, however, require the writer to minimize his remarks and,
it being more important to offer guidance than to praise, most
comments will be on inconsistencies of decisions or dicta with
the legislation and on the inadequacies of current legislation
made apparent through the decisions.
PRENUPTIAL DEBTS
Probably the most startling decision of the two-year period
was that in United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Green2 in which
the court reversed the prior jurisprudence and declared that
antenuptial creditors of the husband were not entitled to enforce
their credits by execution against community assets. The court
relied on two arguments. First, it declared the prior practice
to be founded on the notion the wife had no interest in the com-
munity assets until termination of the regime and that this
notion had been repudiated by later jurisprudence. Second, it
declared article 2403, under which debts incurred during marriage
are payable out of the separate assets of the indebted spouse,
to be conclusive of the issue. Both these arguments were demon-
strated to be false in a very able student Note which was pub-
15. See Sanders, The Anatomy of Proof in Civil Actions, 28 A. L. Rzv.
297, 298 (1968).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1967-1968 Term,
29 LA. L. REV. 171-327 (1969).
2. 252 La. 227, 210 So.2d 328 (1968).
